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Abstract
The object world of the social sciences is complex, historical and self-reflexive. It gener-
ates nonlinear effects, it is unique, and it is able to understand the theories developed 
about it and respond to them intentionally. Recognizing the emergent, historically con-
tingent and self-organizing nature of the social world, and developing responsive policy 
vehicles for managing its complexity, requires a shift in our conception of science in 
general and of economics in particular.
Zusammenfassung
Die Gegenstandswelt der Sozialwissenschaften ist komplex, historisch und reflexiv. Sie 
unterliegt nicht-linearen Effekten, es gibt sie immer nur einmal, sie versteht die über sie 
entwickelten Theorien und reagiert auf sie mit eigenem Willen. Den emergenten, histo-
risch kontingenten und selbstorganisierenden Charakter der sozialen Welt zu erkennen 
und Politikinstrumente zu finden, die ihrer Komplexität gerecht werden, erfordert ein 
verändertes Konzept von Wissenschaft im Allgemeinen und von Wirtschaftstheorie im 
Besonderen.
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A shorter German version of this paper was published in the German business newspaper Handels-
blatt on November 20, 2009.
Much has been written lately about the causes of the global economic crisis. It clearly 
caught world leaders and economists by surprise. How did we get here? Economics is, 
after all, a science, and science is supposed to discover the laws that govern the behaviors 
of objects in their domain (physics discovered that E = mc2, biology has the principle of 
natural selection, and so on). As Richard Posner observed:
Economists pride themselves on being engaged in a scientific endeavor. From the basic premise 
that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions the economist deduces a variety of 
hypotheses, of which the best known is the “law of demand” – a rise in the relative price of a 
product will, other things held constant, cause a reduction in the quantity of the product de-
manded. These hypotheses are confirmed or refuted by studies of actual economic behavior. 
(Posner 1993: 362–363)
Thus the science of economics should have put us in a position to predict what would 
happen under the circumstances that occurred and given us the knowledge to prevent 
such undesirable outcomes. But that didn’t happen. The problem, we think, does not lie 
in particular faulty hypotheses, or mismeasured variables, but rather at a more funda-
mental level. The problem is an overly narrow understanding of the nature of science 
as a solely deductive enterprise, deriving explanations and predictions from universal, 
exceptionless laws based on axiomatic assumptions about individual behavior. Some 
science fits this model; scientific study of social beings like ourselves does not. The social 
world, like most of the biological world and a good part of even the physical world, is 
populated by highly contingent, context-sensitive, emergent complex systems. Under-
standing these features of complexity requires an expansion of our paradigm of science 
itself. 
It makes no sense to expect the economy, or the biosphere, or the global climate to be 
reducible to simple laws which apply to all times and places. Complex systems exhibit 
emergent phenomena, surprising by definition, which arise from the interactions of 
simpler components. These phenomena take on a life of their own, often affecting the 
behavior even of the very components that initially gave rise to them. Feedback and 
chaotic dynamics sensitive to destabilizing conditions, not the step-by-step inevitable 
progress to a predetermined end, is what we should expect of economic behavior. But 
we did not. 
Few economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive failure was the least of the 
field’s problems. More important was the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of cata-
strophic failures in a market economy … The economics profession went astray because econo-
mists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth … Econo-
mists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals 
interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations … (Krugman 2009)
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The world is complex; so, too, should be our representations and analyses of it. Eco-
nomics is not alone in searching for beautiful mathematical simplifications as the goal 
of science. Science has traditionally sought to reduce the “blooming, buzzing confu-
sion” (James 1981 [1890]: 462) of our experience to simple, universal, and timeless un-
derlying laws to explain what there is and how it behaves. The successes of the Scientific 
Revolution of the seventeenth century in providing simplifying, unifying representa-
tions, in particular Newton’s laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation, led 
philosophers to define what they would admit as reliable knowledge in like terms. But 
much of what we know now of the complexity found in the world does not conform 
to the simplifying, reductive and universalizing strategies of a Newtonian paradigm. 
Social, economic behavior is a case in point.
This does not make the complexity of the economic world beyond scientific under-
standing; it requires a recognition that good scientific practice reaches beyond the New-
tonian paradigm. It requires, in many cases, a more explicit and detailed analysis of the 
many roles specific context plays in shaping natural and social phenomena. It means 
that conditions often relegated to the status of “accidents” or “boundary conditions” 
on the old paradigm must be elevated to the subject of scientific study in their own 
right. Historical contingency conspires with episodes of randomness to create the actual 
forms and behaviors that populate the social world. 
To know what will happen, it does not suffice to deduce economic behavior from uni-
versal laws governing rational choice. One must keep track of local and idiosyncratic 
conditions, and especially of the interactions and their feedback on the components, 
which may generate novel, emergent phenomena that change the very rules of the game. 
As Brian Arthur notes, “small events (the mutations of history) are often averaged away, 
but once in a while they become all-important in tilting parts of the economy into new 
structures and patterns that are then preserved” (Arthur 1994: 11–12).
A simple example that shows some of the features of complexity is that of flocking 
birds. Each individual acts in coordination with the other birds – keeping from collid-
ing, moving in the same direction, and staying with the flock. What each bird does de-
pends on the others. In addition the rules guiding their individual behavior can them-
selves evolve, for example, to better adapt to predators who themselves are adapting to 
be better at catching the prey. Explaining the emergent behavior requires integrating 
multiple causes, including the internal rules, the local circumstances, and the adaptive 
environment, which are all changing in relation to each other. Multiple causes at mul-
tiple levels of organization operating at multiple time scales work together to generate 
the behavior we see.
This is very different from some simple cases of physical causation. A billiard ball moves 
in the direction and with the velocity it does because of the impact on it from the cue 
ball. Of course there are slight perturbations in the trajectory, due to spin and friction, 
that would be expected, but for the most part, such behavior is explained by a single 
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dominant cause. Not so in the world of the complex. Certainly there are multiple de-
grees and kinds of complexity. Some systems are closer to the billiard ball, just with a 
greater number of causal influences. The multiplicity of factors is not particularly prob-
lematic, especially if there are simple rules of interaction, such as additivity. However, 
complex systems often involve feedback mechanisms resulting in the amplification or 
dampening of the results or of nonlinear chaotic behavior, and under these conditions, 
causal explanations by additivity will fail. This is what Nobel laureate Robert Solow al-
ludes to when he speaks of “currently fashionable macroeconomics” liking 
to formulate things in a way that inevitably endows the economy with more coherence and pur-
pose than we have any right to assume … I expect that there will be a revival of doing macroeco-
nomics that does not push this kind of coherence on aggregate economic behavior. Which is not 
to say that some individuals don’t behave in a coherent way, but the system does not translate 
that behavior into something like a super-individual.1
Moreover, the social world is not just complex; it is also historical. Of each society, and 
certainly of human society as a whole, there is only one case, not a universe of cases for 
which one could calculate a normal distribution. We observe only one world, not the 
universe of all possible worlds. There is no way, therefore, to imagine a future cleansed 
of chance, or accidents. History unfolds through events that might just as well not have 
taken place, and would by not materializing have made space for a different history. 
Without the First World War and the Russian Revolution, neither of which had to hap-
pen, the twentieth century would have run a different course and modern capitalism 
would not be what it is today; what it would be, however, nobody can know. 
There are obvious parallels here to natural history and the evolution of life. Without the 
extinction of the dinosaurs by a meteorite the advance of the mammals would not have 
taken place and consequently there would be no humans. While we can be sure of this, 
however, we will never be able to say what would have become of the dinosaurs had they 
been allowed to continue their march through time (whether their current descendents, 
for example, would eat with a knife and fork or have more specialized teeth). Historical 
events like the breakdown of Communism in 1989, German unification or the current 
financial crisis may ex post facto be construed as probable or even inevitable; but as 
long as they have not yet happened, other events can happen and prevent, postpone or 
modify them, without anybody ever knowing that they had been about to occur.
Complexity and historicity mean above all that human action inevitably takes place in 
the face of an uncertain future. Uncertainty, as Keynes knew, is not the same as risk, or 
probability: risks can be calculated, uncertainty escapes calculation. “The game of rou-
lette,” Keynes wrote in 1937, 
1 Interview with MIT News Office, October 7, 2009, <http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2009/3q-
solow.html>.
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is not subject to uncertainty … The expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather 
is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which we are using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty 
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners 
in the social system, in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for ac-
tion and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact. 
(Keynes 1937: 213–214)
How can “practical men,” and women, responsibly deal with a world so complex and 
unique that its future will always remain veiled in uncertainty? To begin with, they must 
divest themselves of technocratic illusions of precise predictability and assured control. 
After the crisis caused in 1998 by the crash of the Long Term Capital Management 
fund, it became received wisdom on Wall Street and among American regulators that 
between them they had all the tools needed to handle any crisis that might occur in the 
future. When the former chief of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified before 
the House Government Oversight Committee on October 24, 2008 – in his own words: 
“in a state of shocked disbelief” – he looked back at 
a vast risk management and pricing system … combining the best insights of mathematicians 
and finance experts supported by major advances in computer and communications technol-
ogy. [Even] a Nobel Prize was awarded for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins 
much of the advance in derivatives markets.
Based on this “intellectual edifice,” which, in Greenspan’s words, “collapsed in the sum-
mer of 2007,” regulators had allowed financial engineers, in the name of innovation and 
efficiency, to introduce more and more new “products,” under what was euphemisti-
cally called “light touch regulation.” Nobody imagined, or perhaps cared, how costly it 
would turn out to be for society to clean up the mess caused by the next crisis that was 
about to come in 2007.
What someone like Greenspan, committed to the mechanistic machine model of stan-
dard economics, did not take into account was that, as technical capacities increase and 
the range of the possible expands, complexity and uncertainty increase as well. The 
more we calculate, the less calculable the future may become. Growing complexity in 
a historical world means that policy must be prepared to expect the unexpected, and 
develop routines of action that are ready for it. This is how nuclear reactors are run – 
which are of course much less complex than a globalized world economy. The breeding 
of money in an investment bank is no less unpredictable, and certainly no less danger-
ous in a global economy, than the breeding of plutonium in a nuclear power plant. 
Nobody in their right mind would, in order not to stifle innovation, allow the operators 
of nuclear reactors to try out whatever new tricks come to their mind to increase the 
efficiency of their plant, on the assumption that the accidents that will perhaps ensue 
can be expertly handled by the firefighters. 
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New frameworks for policy may be better able to handle the kind of deep uncertain-
ty that social complexity entails. Adaptive management in place of “predict-and-act” 
models introduces flexibility to respond to both new situations and new knowledge of 
the situation. Where we cannot predict, we should not pretend to know what the future 
will hold. As noted, we cannot even reliably assign probabilities to future conditions. 
Our understanding of what will happen next needs to be updated regularly. Monitoring 
and adjusting regulations in light of dynamically changing conditions is a better match 
to the kind of complexity found in the social world than expectations based on a time-
honored paradigm of simple, linear, deterministic models. Surprises, ironically, should 
be expected.
Finally, there is one more reason why human societies cannot be explained or con-
trolled by deterministic theories. In addition to being subject to emergence and shaped 
by historical events, societies are self-referential: they learn about and can take into ac-
count the theories developed and deployed to govern them. Human beings are capable 
of agency: they do not just behave, i.e. respond automatically to whatever stimuli they 
are exposed to, but they act intentionally. Man, according to none other than Charles 
Darwin, is a “moral being” who “is capable of comparing his past and future actions or 
motives, and of approving or disapproving of them” (Darwin 1871: 482–483). This is 
why machine-model theories of social or economic processes tend to have only a lim-
ited shelf life if any: they cannot be kept secret, and their use gets noticed, investigated 
for its intentions, and responded to intentionally. A well-known example is the famous 
Hawthorne experiments (1924–1932), where the researchers thought they had found 
that workers work faster and better, even without a wage increase, if the walls of their 
workshop are painted yellow and managers are nicer to them. But once the workers 
discovered that the fresh color and the new kindness were “only” to save money, they 
went on strike for better pay. Something similar happened posthumously to none other 
than Keynes who, of course, was as much as any economist aware of the importance of 
expectations. When in the 1970s Keynesian demand management had become an es-
tablished practice in Western countries, firms and consumers reacted ever more slowly 
to lowered interest rates, believing that as stagnation continued, interest rates would be 
lowered even further. In the end the theory ceased to work because it had become com-
mon knowledge and a point of departure for strategic action of its subjects.
Another, and perhaps the most important, aspect of self-reflexivity is that, while so-
cieties may not be governed by unchanging natural laws, they can govern themselves 
through laws of their own, in the form of institutions. Again, we can turn to Keynes for 
elaboration. In 1937, in an essay that reads as though it had been written to explain the 
current crisis, Keynes argued against the belief of “classical economic theory” that free 
markets are subject to law-like regularities that can be discovered by theory and used by 
policy to control the future. To the contrary, Keynes wrote, since in a free market un-
certainty exists not just for the observer but also, and most importantly, for the partici-
pants, the latter are bound to behave in a way that will continuously produce random 
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disturbances, by following the behavior and adopting the expectations of others who, 
in turn, do the same: 
Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall back on the judg-
ment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. That is, we endeavor to conform 
with the behavior of the majority or the average … A practical theory of the future … being 
based on such a flimsy foundation … is subject to sudden and violent changes … New fears 
and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may 
suddenly impose a new basis of valuation … (Keynes 1937: 214)
Markets, Keynes continues, become predictable, not through the refined mathemat-
ics of positivistic theories, but only through regulation: through human intervention 
imposing order on them by subjecting them to man-made laws as distinguished from 
natural laws – through instituted laws created by legislation, instead of natural laws 
identified by science. According to Keynes, it is only in what he called “a nicely regulated 
market” that “pretty, polite techniques” like those of “classical economic theory” can 
work at all (Keynes 1937: 215). 
It is at this point at the latest that economics must turn into political economy. Societies 
cannot wait for their order to be discovered for them by scientists: they have to produce 
their order themselves. If they fail to use human agency collectively to get organized, 
it will permanently give rise to disorganization through the unpredictable emergent 
effects of individually rational strategic action. There is, in other words, no way of re-
placing politics by science. Of course, unlike the world of standard economics, politics 
is messy and by definition contested, but so is life. Adam Smith’s favorite academic 
discipline was astronomy – indeed, its Newtonian version, in which stars and planets 
move majestically around each other, on precisely predictable orbits, in eternal self-
reproducing equilibrium. It was not Smith’s fault that he knew nothing of the chaotic 
dynamics of an expanding universe.
When economic science is based on an out-of-date paradigm of what science looks like, 
i.e. deterministic, linear, simple and reductive, it will fail to comprehend the complexity 
that will continue to shape our future. Recognizing the emergent, historically contin-
gent, self-organizing and self-reflective character of the social world, and developing 
responsive policy vehicles for managing that complexity, requires a shift in our concep-
tion of science in general and of economic science in particular. To pretend otherwise 
in order to satisfy a preconceived notion of order in the world or of elegance and sim-
plicity in its theoretical representation is to miss out entirely on what is in front of us: a 
dynamically changing, complicated, complex, and chaotic but understandable universe. 
We need to embrace more than the simple, and expect less than the fully predictable. 
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